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THE BIRTH AND REBIRTH OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN 
AMERICA 
Leslie F. Goldstein* 
 GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE 
INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2013) Pp. 304. Hardcover $ 39.00. 
 
 GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: THE 
CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 (2012). Pp. 224. 
Hardcover $ 41.95. 
 
The titles of these two books promise an introduction to the creation of a body of 
law, civil rights, in the United States in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. The first 
use of the term “civil rights” in a United States legislative enactment occurred in the 1866 
Civil Rights Act.1 It was also used in an early draft of Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, within weeks of the adoption of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.2 John Bingham, 
author of the constitutionally formative second sentence of Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, originally opposed using “civil rights” in the language of the 1866 Act be-
cause, he said, he feared that it implied the right to vote (a right that, on January 25, 1866, 
he said he favored, but believed was not yet politically attainable).3 At his criticism, the 
phrase was removed from the internal language of the bill but retained in its title.4 The bill 
did get adopted, even over the veto of (Tennessean) President Andrew Johnson and with-
out the vote of John Bingham. Bingham believed the Constitution needed first to be 
amended so that Congress would be explicitly authorized to protect these rights, and they 
would be secured against retrenchment by later Congresses.5 Later, as Rutherglen explains, 
the 1866 Act, adopted under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment by a Congress 
that understood itself to be forbidding the imposition of “badges and incidents of slavery,” 
came, unfortunately, to be viewed as all that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited, that 
is governmental action (and perhaps biased inaction) abridging privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States, or depriving persons of equal protection or due process of 
                                                          
 * Judge Hugh M. Morris Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Emerita, University of 
Delaware.  
 1. GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: THE CONSTITUTION, COMMON 
LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 4 (2012). 
 2. GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 119 (2013).   
 3. Id. at 113, 119. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 119-20.  
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law. And, relatedly, the enforcement power of Congress under both Amendments was also 
for a long time seen as thusly limited to correction of state action (and possibly also sys-
tematic governmental inaction) of this sort.6 To some degree, the reader does get the story 
of this development from the combination of these two books. I will retell this story briefly 
below, and then I will offer a more complete overview of the two books. 
Before 1866, there were some citizen rights, called in the Constitution “[p]rivileges 
and [i]mmunities of [c]itizens[hip],”7 but these rights were understood to be determined 
by state citizenship. Each state granted to its own citizens whatever it considered to be 
their citizen rights, and whichever of those rights were the “fundamental” ones, said the 
Supreme Court in Corfield v. Coryell,8 Article Four, Section Two of the United States 
Constitution forbade the state to deny to incoming American citizens from other states.9   
This protection proved inadequate because states put their own citizens into hierar-
chical categories—most notoriously, white and colored—and then denied rights as funda-
mental as the freedom of locomotion to people of color, whether from within or without 
the state.10 Many Northern states had laws, albeit unenforced ones, forbidding the entry of 
outside Negroes for purposes of residency. Southern states did enforce their Negro Seaman 
Acts, laws restraining Negro sailors employed on boats docked in town by the requirement 
that those men, citizens or not, be literally imprisoned in town until the boat was ready to 
depart. Justice John Marshall (on circuit in 1820) refused to apply such a law (although he 
did this by indirection) and Justice William Johnson (on circuit in 1823) flatly declared 
such laws unconstitutional; his decision did not help the seaman in question because the 
Supreme Court did not have power prior to the Civil War to issue a writ of habeas corpus 
to a state judge. In 1853, a Southern Federal District Court Judge sitting alone as a circuit 
court judge, with Justice Wayne unable to attend, declared one such Negro Seamen law 
constitutional. All of these cases involved foreign sailors, so the issue was never joined 
whether these laws violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause with respect to black 
citizens of northern states.11 
John Bingham (1815-1900)—raised in a small town in rural east-central Ohio, 
brought up in a staunchly anti-slavery Church, educated at a tiny college whose president 
                                                          
 6. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 1, at 14. 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 8. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (1823). 
 9. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2. 
 10. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 1, at 23. 
 11. See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (1823) (Justice Johnson declaring unconstitutional on com-
merce clause grounds a South Carolina law that imprisoned free persons of color who worked on ships that 
landed in South Carolina for the duration of the ship’s stay, and according to which, if the ship abandoned them 
there, they would be sold as slaves); The Wilson v. United States, 30 F. Cas. 239 (1820) (Justice Marshall de-
claring through rather tortured reasoning that the Virginia law meant to keep free Negro seamen imprisoned 
while docked, did not apply to the seamen “of color” in question). The third, Roberts v. Yates, 20 F. Cas. 937 
(1853) is the only one cited in the Rutherglen volume under review here; this book erroneously states that the 
South Carolina Negro Seaman’s Law “was eventually upheld against challenges that it violated the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.” RUTHERGLEN, supra note 1, at 23. The plaintiff, Roberts was a native of Nassau in the 
Bahamas, not a citizen of a U.S. state, and was employed on a British ship and he claimed that the South Carolina 
law violated commercial treaty law with Great Britain (and implicitly the foreign commerce power of Congress). 
He could not have brought a challenge that the law violated the “privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States.” 
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was an outspoken abolitionist, resident in a part of Ohio where some of the earliest argu-
ments that the Constitution is an antislavery document were being published by such men 
as Theodore Weld, and trained as an attorney—was troubled by the lack of protection for 
free blacks both before and after the Civil War.12 Bingham was active in party politics 
from the early years of his career as an attorney: first, in an antislavery wing of the Whig 
Party and later the Free Soil and then the Republican Party.13 His earliest years as a polit-
ical activist do not publicly show antislavery sentiment; in 1844 he campaigned for pro-
slavery Whig Henry Clay (not for the Liberty Party), and in 1848, he campaigned for 
Zachary Taylor (not for the Free Soil Party).14 In a private letter from December of 1850 
to then-Senator Salmon Chase, a fellow Ohioan, Bingham bemoaned of the 1850 Fugitive 
Slave Act that “[a]ll men who have souls are indignant,” but publicly took the stance that 
all unrepealed laws must be obeyed.15 In another private letter of the same month, he in-
sisted that he wanted the Fugitive Slave Act amended.16 But publicly, his stance was 
simply that the Union itself had done much to check slavery, for instance, ending the for-
eign slave trade and checking its expansion above the Missouri Compromise line of 1820, 
and that continuing to uphold national laws offered hope for further reform.17  
By 1852, having lost a judgeship election in 1851, Bingham finally took a firm anti-
slavery stand, authoring a resolution for his county Whig party that called for amending 
the Fugitive Slave Act, forbidding any new slave states, and ending slavery in the District 
of Columbia and in all federal territory.18 From this point on his position was that of the 
Free Soil Party, but in Ohio that position was taken by a group called the Free Democrats.19 
Bingham stayed out of politics in 1853, but after the 1854 Kansas Nebraska Bill was in-
troduced (letting slavery spread above the 1820 line via popular sovereignty), a furious 
Bingham was drawn back into the fray, running for the House of Representatives on what 
was called the Anti-Nebraska Party.20 To him, it was now clear that compromise with the 
South was no longer possible.21 A local paper reported him as having “gone completely 
over to the abolitionists.”22 At this point, Bingham’s publicly stated views were not fully 
abolitionist but included the relatively radical position that Congress acted unconstitution-
ally in authorizing slavery in any territory beyond the original thirteen states.23 Bingham 
won the election, and in those days, Congressmen did not take office until December of 
the year following the election, which would be December 1855.24 The full statement of 
his antislavery position was not to come until 1859, but by January 1857, a couple of 
months before the Dred Scott decision, his fully stated view had come to be that the Bill 
                                                          
 12. MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 6, 11, 16, 19. 
 13. Id. at 20, 38-39. 
 14. See id. at 27, 31. 
 15. Id. at 32. 
 16. Id. at 33. 
 17. Id. at 32-33. 
 18. Id. at 38. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 39-40. 
 21. Id. at 40. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 40-41. 
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of Rights—including the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause—was supposed to govern 
Congress’s action in admitting any new states beyond the first Thirteen.25 Since this clause 
said that no person could be deprived of liberty without the kind of process involved in 
trials for crimes, and since the Constitution everywhere referred to slaves as persons, Con-
gress had been obligated since 1789 to forbid slavery in carrying out its power to admit 
new states.26 Bingham argued that the “primal object” of the Constitution “must be to pro-
tect each human being within its jurisdiction in the free and full enjoyment of his natural 
rights,” and “the equal protection of each” is a “principle[] of our Constitution.”27  
The entry of Oregon into the Union in 1859 provoked John Bingham to develop his 
full-blown anti-slavery theory of civil rights.28 Oregon’s constitution prohibited negroes 
or mulattos from entering or residing in Oregon, from making contracts, from owning land, 
and from “maintain[ing] any suit” (in courts), and provided for punishing persons employ-
ing blacks or helping them enter.29 John Bingham insisted (to no avail) that Oregon should 
be kept out of the Union until it changed this constitution.30 These prohibitions, he argued, 
violated the natural right of free persons to live in the land of their birth.31 Moreover, they 
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, Section Two since (in con-
trast to “political rights” like voting) the rights of coming into a state, acquiring and en-
joying property there (which, per the Fifth Amendment, could not be taken away without 
just compensation), making contracts and filing lawsuits (with protection of the right to 
trial by jury, per the Sixth and Seventh Amendments, as well as Article Three) were “priv-
ileges of citizens of the United States” which no state could take away.32 In addition, “no 
one should be deprived of life or liberty but as punishment for crime” (per the Fifth 
Amendment).33 Bingham admitted that the phrase “of the United States” did not appear in 
Article Four, Section Two, but he considered it an implied ellipsis that made sense of the 
clause.34 Therefore, “free African-Americans were ‘entitled to all the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States, amongst which are the rights to life, liberty, and 
property, and their due protection in the enjoyment thereof by law.’”35 
Here one sees the origin of the later Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
also the nature of Bingham’s understanding of the linkage between the rights that ended 
up listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the rights of the first eight Amendments to 
the Constitution, which Bingham said more than once were what was meant in the Four-
teenth Amendment phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”36 In 
Bingham’s view, these fundamental rights or “privileges and immunities” of citizens were 
                                                          
 25. Id. at 53. 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 27. MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 56. 
 28. Id. at 62. 
 29. Id. at 63. 
 30. See id. at 62. 
 31. Id. at 63 
 32. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 33. MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 223 n.212. 
 34. Id. at 63. 
 35. Id. at 223 n.213. 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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an amalgam of natural rights (such as the right to acquire and enjoy property) and conven-
tional rights (such as the right to trial by jury).37 After slavery was abolished in the Thir-
teenth Amendment, such that all African-Americans were now free, he made it his point 
to see to it that the Constitution be again amended.38 The follow-up amendment would 
have to assure, first, African-Americans’ citizenship (contrary to the Dred Scott decision) 
and, secondly, African-Americans’ privileges and immunities of national citizenship (for 
Bingham, at least, a combination of natural rights and common law rights) and African-
Americans’ (along with other persons’) natural rights to equal protection and due process 
of law.39 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 had, like the Fourteenth Amendment, begun with a 
sentence declaring all persons born in the United States except persons “subject to a for-
eign power” and except “Indians not taxed,” to be citizens.40 It then addressed the same 
concerns later described in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, but instead of the 
broad phrase “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,” had listed spe-
cific citizen rights: the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evi-
dence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property. 
It said that irrespective of race or previous servitude, all citizens’ rights to these things 
shall be the same as that of white citizens, and that they shall be subject to like pains and 
punishments, any “law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwith-
standing.”41 In his veto of this Bill, President Andrew Johnson had declared that he did not 
believe that the freed slaves “possess[ed] the requisite qualifications to entitle them to all 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,” even though the 1866 Bill 
nowhere used this phrase.42 In explaining his own vote against the Civil Rights Bill of 
1866, Bingham described it as “legislation to enforce in its letter and spirit the bill of rights 
as embodied in [the] Constitution,” and said he would support such legislation as soon as 
the Constitution itself was amended to authorize it.43 Thus, we observe from its very be-
ginnings that the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens[hip]” was understood in 
                                                          
 37. MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 64. 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 64. 
 39. MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 65. 
 40. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 1, at 51-52. Rutherglen errs, in my view, in interpreting the exclusion of Indians 
from coverage as a racist move. The 1866 exclusion of aliens by silent omission and the exclusion of aliens from 
having property rights in the 1870 Act may well have had some racist motivation, since that Act was adopted 
with discussion of the Chinese and their rights, deliberately retaining the exclusion of non-white, non-black per-
sons (i.e., Asians) from permission to naturalize. But the exclusion of “Indians not taxed” was a recognition 
respectful of Indian sovereignty; it applied to those Indians living on tribal land under tribal government. Other 
Indians were supposed to get civil rights. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) got it wrong. Compare Gary A. 
Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 
CAL. L. REV. 662, 663-64 n.9, 671 n.40, 673-74 nn.52-55 (1975); Id. at 663-64 n.9 (describing the Fourteenth 
Amendment understood by its supporters as entrenching the principles of the 1866 Civil Rights Act in regards to 
“every person of color,” “domesticated” Indians who “live in civilized society,” and “Indians not taxed”); Id. at 
611, n.40 & 673-674 nn.52-55 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 489, 572-73, 599 (“every person of 
color”), 498 (“domesticated” Indians who “live in civilized society”), 572 (“Indians not taxed”), 573 (discussing 
coverage by 1866 Act of non-reservation Indians), with RUTHERGLEN, supra note 1, at 63 (citing the very Con-
gressional testimony that acknowledges the quasi-sovereignty of tribal governments). 
 41. Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866). 
 42. MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 120 (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. 
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some quarters to be fully covered by the list of property rights and use of the legal system 
“for security of person and property” that were in fact itemized in the Civil Rights Act, 
and in other quarters, to embrace both these listed rights and the first eight amendments to 
the Constitution, called by John Bingham “the bill of rights.”44 Additionally, in his 1859 
critique of the Oregon Constitution, Bingham said that the right to travel among the states 
was one of the privileges of United States citizenship; for him the “privileges or immuni-
ties” phrase referred to all rights mentioned in the Constitution, and he understood Article 
Four, Section Two to imply a right to travel into any state without encountering legislative 
discrimination there.45 This ambiguity in the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States” led to the historic debate between proponents of “wholesale” versus 
“selective” incorporation of the first eight amendments to be applied against state govern-
ments by the Fourteenth Amendment (not via the Privileges or Immunities Clause, as 
Bingham expected, but after the Slaughter-House Cases’ evisceration of that clause, via 
the Due Process Clause).46 
Bingham had expressed concern that the Civil Rights Act did not protect aliens as it 
should; they too have a right to engage in commerce, make contracts, and be equally pro-
tected by the laws.47 The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified by the states (including Southern 
ones, which were kept out of Congress until they ratified it) by 1868, did extend both equal 
protection of the laws and the protection of life, liberty and property subject to due process 
of law to all “person[s],” not simply to citizens.48 When Congress adopted the Enforcement 
Act of 1870, it took Bingham’s concerns into account.49 It (in Section Sixteen) specifically 
re-listed all the rights from the 1866 Act except “the right to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold and convey real and personal property”50 and extended them to not just citizens but 
“all persons.” And just to be on the safe side in terms of constitutionality, it announced (in 
Section Eighteen) that the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866 “is hereby re-enacted.”51 
Magliocca’s book makes clear (if readers still doubt it after reading work on the 
subject by Michael Kent Curtis and Akhil Amar) that Bingham believed the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights provisions and 
other rights provisions of the Constitution against state governments.52 His book, though, 
does uncover an intriguing incident of ambiguity as to what other members of Congress 
believed the Fourteenth Amendment established. Bingham chaired the House Judiciary 
Committee in 1871 when it was faced with a petition from Victoria Woodhull asking that 
the House adopt legislation to “secure to citizens of the United States the right to vote 
without regard to sex,” on the grounds that voting was a “privilege or immunity of citizens 
                                                          
 44. 14 Stat. 27; MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 120-22.   
 45. MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 63. 
 46. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 63; RUTHERGLEN, supra 
note 1, at 141. 
 47. MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 119.  
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 49. Cf. MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 120 (stating erroneously that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was amended 
to accommodate this criticism. That did not happen until the 1870 Civil Rights Act).   
 50. Prohibitions on foreigners’ owning land were common among the states, and initially were not racially 
biased. See Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870).  
 51. Id.  
 52. MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 62-63. 
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of the United States.”53 By this time the Fifteenth Amendment had been both proposed and 
ratified. Bingham had pushed hard for a stronger version of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
successfully urging that religious creed and property also be forbidden grounds for deny-
ing the vote. His amendments to this effect, however, had been dropped in conference 
committee, and the Amendment as we know it is what went to the states for ratification.54 
Now, faced with the question whether voting was a privilege or immunity of citizenship, 
the committee replied rather obscurely, as follows: 
 
Section One did not “refer to privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States other than those embraced in the original text of the 
Constitution” by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Put another way, 
the Fourteenth Amendment “did not add to the privileges or immunities 
before mentioned, but was deemed necessary to their enforcement. It 
had been judicially determined that the first eight articles of amendment 
to the Constitution were not limitations on the power of the States, and 
it was apprehended that the same might be held of the [Privileges and 
Immunities Clause].” Accordingly, the committee held that the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause “did not change or modify the relations of 
citizens of the State and nation as they existed under the original Con-
stitution.”55 
 
This last internal quote is both shocking and is a foreshadowing of what the Supreme Court 
majority would say two years later in the Slaughter-House Cases.56 It comes during the 
same session of Congress when Bingham said (speaking for himself, as distinguished from 
reporting views of a committee): “The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the first eight 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”57 He then read aloud the entirety of 
the eight amendments and said that they had not been treated as limiting the power of the 
States “until made so by the fourteenth amendment.”58 The Committee Report passage 
certainly seems in tension with this statement of Bingham’s own views, and it would have 
been both helpful and interesting for Magliocca to let his readers know who else was on 
this Committee, and what their political commitments were. At a minimum, it suggests 
that the Slaughter-House Cases majority opinion similarly diminishing the import of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was reflective of some segment of opinion beyond that of 
the five justices who signed on to it. 
The Magliocca volume is a biography; it is not limited to a discussion of Bingham’s 
role in shaping the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In the book, we learn of his role 
                                                          
 53. Id. at 159. 
 54. Id. at 155-56. 
 55. Id. at 159. The extended quote is Magliocca paraphrasing the report. 
 56. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 57. MAGLIOCCA, supra note 2, at 122 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. at 84 (1871)). 
 58. Id.  
7
Goldstein: The Birth and Rebirth of Civil Rights in America
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
324 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:317  
as a prosecutor of the John Wilkes Booth conspiracy59 and as the lead attorney in the Im-
peachment/Removal Trial of President Andrew Johnson for, essentially, attempting to 
undo the required military supervision of elections in the South to carry out the Recon-
struction Acts (which he had vetoed).60 We learn of Bingham’s exit from Congress in 
187261 due to redistricting and his subsequent career as an Ambassador to Japan.62 And 
we learn what little is available in the records about his family life.63 But the book is of 
interest because of his role as a “founding son,” in Magliocca’s apt phrase. The book is a 
good read and well-documented; however, readers would have been better able to assess 
its contribution had the author made clear how he understands its contents to differ from 
earlier work on Bingham by Erving Beauregard,64 whose 1989 biography is cited in both 
bibliography and endnotes, and by Richard Aynes,65 whose three lengthy articles on Bing-
ham are similarly cited. 
Magliocca’s book makes plain that John Bingham understood the rights he fought 
to protect in the Fourteenth Amendment as basically natural rights which had already been 
incorporated into American positive law but (prior to the Amendment) incompletely; 
George Rutherglen takes a different view.66 His book, Civil Rights in the Shadow of Slav-
ery: The Constitution, Common Law, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, is specifically about 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.67 He describes the 1866 Act as a “bridge” between the priv-
ileges and immunities of state citizenship protected in Article IV and those of national 
citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.68 He says that the 1866 Act “took the 
previously recognized privileges and immunities of citizenship [and] gave them content 
from the common law” and then said these were rights that must be recognized irrespective 
of race.69 As the book’s title indicates, Rutherglen considers the fact that the 1866 Act 
constitutionalized the freedom from discrimination with respect to common law rights to 
be of signal importance, although the book failed to convince me of this.70 Interestingly, 
Rutherglen agrees with Bingham that the 1866 Act was unconstitutional until rendered 
constitutional by the Fourteenth Amendment.71 
One comes to understand the source of Rutherglen’s  differing from Bingham on the 
nature of civil rights as follows: William Blackstone, readers learn, described property 
rights as “civil rights conferred upon individuals” under the social contract “in exchange 
                                                          
 59. Id. at 89. 
 60. Id. at 142. 
 61. Id. at 154. 
 62. Id. at 167. 
 63. Id. at 6. 
 64. Id. at 277. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 56. 
 67. See generally RUTHERGLEN, supra note 1. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 11. 
 70. Rutherglen himself acknowledges that “the basic rights protected by the act” were contemporaneously 
“characterize[d]” by “various” terms: “natural rights, common law rights, privileges or immunities, and civil 
rights.” Id. at 74. Despite this acknowledgment, he lapses back into certainty and inevitability language when he 
says that framers of the 1866 Act “had nowhere to turn other than to the resources of the common law.” Id. at 
174.  
 71. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 1, at 73. 
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for that degree of natural freedom” that people give up to enter society.72 By contrast, John 
Bingham apparently sided with John Locke (Second Treatise) in believing that property 
rights were natural rights that people retained as inalienable.73 Rutherglen traces the phrase 
“civil rights” back to sixth century Justinian, but the real insight from his historical exege-
sis does not come until his exploration of the connections among slave codes, postbellum 
Black Codes, and the 1866 Act.74 The civil rights encoded by the latter turn out to be the 
“mirror image” of slave status.75 What the slave codes took away, the Civil Rights Act 
gave back. 
Rutherglen’s book is meant simply as a history of one law, perhaps the most im-
portant law ever adopted in the U.S., but that deliberately narrow focus provides a certain 
distortion in the history presented in the book. The book limits its gaze resolutely to civil 
rights as they were understood by drafters of that 1866 law and as those rights evolved 
over time. Originally, the right to vote and the right to serve on juries were both widely 
understood (despite Bingham’s remark to the contrary noted above) as political rights, 
rather than civil rights.76 By 1870, American blacks possessed both because the Fifteenth 
Amendment had been ratified.77 Instead of relating the downs and ups that followed for 
these rights, Rutherglen says that with a single deviation for Buchanan v. Warley,78 the 
period from Yick Wo v. Hopkins79 to Shelley v. Kraemer80 was flatly a “period of civil 
rights neglect.”81 This book ignores the history of the Southern dispossession of  both jury 
and voting rights from blacks,82 the Fuller Court’s complicity therein,83 the near miss by 
                                                          
 72. Id. at 41. 
 73. Id. at 42. 
 74. Id. at 53. 
 75. Id. at 45-47, 54, 160. 
 76. Id. at 41. 
 77. Id. at 80. 
 78. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
 79. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 80. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 81. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 1, at 121.   
 82. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1888-1910 (1974) (documenting the wave of voting rights depri-
vation measures that swept the South; jury lists generally came from voter lists). 
 83. To cite just five examples of the Fuller Court’s deliberate turning of a blind eye when compelling evi-
dence of unconstitutional disenfranchisement of blacks was presented to it: (1) The first instance was Mills v. 
Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895). After district court Judge Goff had enjoined the holding of elections for the South 
Carolina constitutional convention on the grounds that the voting rules and their blatant manipulation violated 
the Fifteenth Amendment, Chief Justice Fuller, sitting on circuit, lifted the injunction saying that the district court 
judge erred in assuming jurisdiction “to protect the purely political rights of individuals.” Green v Mills, 69 F. 
852, 858 (1895). Then in Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895), the Supreme Court ruled the case moot, since the 
election had been held. (2) Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) refused to declare void the Mississippi 
system for excluding black voters and consequently black jurors on the grounds that the fact pattern of discrim-
ination was not as extreme as the one in Yick Wo v. Hopkins. (3) Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903) refused 
to overturn the voting system of Alabama on the grounds that even if the allegations were true, and “the great 
mass of the white population intend[ed] to keep the blacks from voting,” nonetheless, “relief from a great political 
wrong” can come only from “the legislative and political department of the government of the United States.” 
(4) Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904) refused to grant either a damages award or writ of mandamus to deal 
with the massive deprivation of black voting rights in Alabama. (5) Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904) 
refused to intervene against massive administrative manipulation denying voting rights to blacks in Virginia on 
the grounds that the 1902 election had already taken place, so the issue was moot.   
   Eleven appeals went to the Fuller Court between 1891 and 1906 to reverse murder convictions of blacks, 
several of which documented massively biased jury selection systems. The Fuller Court did not overturn a single 
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the Republicans in 1889-1890 to adopt new federal enforcement machinery to protect 
black voters in the South,84 the 1894 removal of voting rights protections from the federal 
code by a Democratic Congress without a filibuster by the Republicans, and then the grad-
ual restoration of voting and jury rights by post-Fuller Supreme Courts,85 including the 
gradual beginning of the end to Jim Crow and the insistence on due process for (Southern 
black) criminals by the Supreme Court of the thirties and forties.86  
 Rutherglen summarizes the failure of Reconstruction with this statement: “Indif-
ference rather than hostility defeated the efforts to achieve the ambitious goals of Recon-
struction.”87 This statement is misleadingly incomplete. No doubt the indifference of the 
Northern public and the costliness of maintaining a military presence for decades in the 
South, or even of an imaginably huge administrative presence, prevented the kind of en-
during enforcement that Reconstruction would have required, were it not to have been 
postponed for a hundred years. But such a military or administrative effort would not have 
been needed at all if not for the implacable, violent, and enduring white Southern hostility 
to allowing blacks their Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights—rights under the two 
amendments that were forced upon the South as the price of readmission into Congress. 
Nor is “indifference” adequate to characterize the callous blindness exhibited by the Fuller 
Court (1888-1910) to the deprivation of jury and voting rights of blacks, nor to characterize 
the Democratic Congress’s attitude in eliminating from the federal code all voting rights 
enforcement laws in 1894. 
The reason for Rutherglen’s focus becomes clear in chapters seven, eight, and nine, 
where the book really has a story to tell. It is a terrifically interesting story (although it 
could perhaps have been more compellingly told within the confines of one substantial 
law review article). These chapters comprise the final third of the book. The story is basi-
cally about what happened to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co. 
(1968),88 in the follow-up to this Supreme Court decisions in Sullivan v. Little Hunting 
                                                          
conviction, at most returning the case to the state judicial system for a second look. Leslie F. Goldstein, How 
Equal Protection Did and Did Not Come to the United States, and the Executive Branch Role Therein, 73 MD. 
L. REV. 190, 223-26 (2013).  
 84. The Hoar-Lodge Act would have become law but for the deployment by Senate Democrats of first a 
filibuster and then a mass Democratic walkout to prevent a quorum. See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE 
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 182-85 (2011).   
 85. The White Court (1911-1920) in eleven years produced two anti-segregation decisions (Rutherglen men-
tions only Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); the other was McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Railway Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914)); upheld two convictions under the federal anti-peonage law, declaring void 
both a debt servitude law, Bailey v. U.S. II, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) and a criminal surety statute, United States v. 
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); and issued three pro-voting-rights decisions (striking down grandfather clauses): 
Guinn and Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); Myers v. 
Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).  
  The Taft Court (1921-1930) struck down the white primary law of Texas in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 
536 (1927) and ruled that lynch-mob-dominated trials violate the due process clause in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 
U.S. 86 (1923).  
 86. Jim Crow begins to end with Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) and Mitchell v. 
United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941). The Hughes Court (1930-1941) threw out convictions for biased jury selection 
in five different cases and produced eight cases protecting Southern blacks who had been denied due process in 
sham trials. See Leslie F. Goldstein, Asian and Black Intersectionality in Racial Discrimination Policy, 1866-
1954, 30-32, 37 (2014 APSA Annual Meeting), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2455765.   
 87. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 1, at 100. 
 88. Id. at 137. 
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Park, Inc. (1969),89 Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n (1973),90 Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency (1975),91 and Runyon v. McCrary (1976),92 and in the Congres-
sional ratification and expansion of these decisions in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. As a 
teacher of the constitutional law of civil rights, I was previously aware of the bare bones 
of this story.93 However, I did not really grasp its profound impact on the practice of em-
ployment discrimination law. What I had already understood is that Jones v. Alfred Mayer 
transformed Section 1982 (whose words simply restated the equal right to buy and sell 
property from the 1866 Civil Rights Act) into a civil rights law that could be violated by 
private individuals (i.e. without state action), and into one that did not have to be tied to 
interstate commerce, thereby causing the Section to reach more broadly than the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, and even than the 1968 Open Housing Act. What Rutherglen’s book also 
taught me is that the Court’s move in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, 
extending Jones’s logic to Section 1981 on contracts, meant that racially discriminatory 
employment contracts all over America would now be correctable not only by federal in-
junction (per Title VII), but also by damages remedies, and not only for big businesses, 
but also small employers.94 Once damages opened up, then lawyers throughout the land 
had incentives to bring discrimination lawsuits (for they would get one-third of the award). 
And, since these rulings applied only to racial discrimination, because the Thirteenth 
Amendment power (foundation of the 1866 Act) applied to removing badges and incidents 
of slavery, Congress had incentive, on basic fairness grounds, to extend the potential for 
damages awards to other groups that it had used its commerce power to protect against 
employment discrimination, such as women, the elderly and the disabled.95 This Congress 
did in 1991.96 Jones v. Alfred Mayer had a profound ripple effect on employment law in 
America. This is an intriguing story, and one well worth reading. 
This employment law development dramatically expanded the range of congression-
ally protected and protectable civil rights. At least as to male persons, this development 
might well be one that John Bingham would have welcomed. He would have gone further 
than the Supreme Court, however, and would have wanted it to declare long ago that all 
the protections of the Bill of Rights apply as restrictions on government at the state level 
as well as the federal. 
 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 145. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 146. 
 92. Id. at 148. 
 93. And had even written a (widely neglected) article on an early phase of this development. See Leslie F. 
Goldstein, Death and Transfiguration of the State Action Doctrine: Moose Lodge v. Irvis to Runyon v. McCrary, 
4 HASTINGS CONST L. Q. 1 (1977). 
 94. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 1, at 145. 
 95. Id. at 151. 
 96. Id. 
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